This paper presents the first empirical analysis of the choice of firms regarding whether to release private information ("prepare the market") in advance of a possible dividend cut and the consequences of such market preparation. We use a hand-collected data set of dividend cutting firms, which allows us to distinguish between prepared and nonprepared dividend cutters and to test the implications of two alternative theories: the "signaling through market preparation" theory and the "stock return volatility reduction" theory. We document several important differences between prepared and nonprepared dividend cutters. Overall, our empirical results are consistent with the signaling theory.
I. Introduction
How should firms communicate with the capital market in advance of corporate events? If firm insiders receive some private information that their firm may perform poorly in the near future, should they inform investors about this adverse information as soon as possible or should they wait to release this information? Furthermore, is the manner of communication by firms related to their performance in the short or the long run?
A concrete example of the above situation is that of a firm contemplating a dividend cut in the future. Firm insiders may have received some private information about a potential decline in future earnings or that the current level of dividends is unsustainable for some other reason (e.g., a change in the competitive environment requiring it to retain more cash within the firm). Under these circumstances, should insiders release a statement to the market that they are reviewing the firm's dividend policy and indicating that there is a possibility of a dividend cut (in other words, "prepare the market")? Or should they wait until they, in fact, decide to cut their firm's dividends before making any announcement? 1 While there have been several theoretical as well as empirical analyses of dividend signaling (see, e.g., Bhattacharya (1979) , John and Williams (1985) , and Miller and Rock (1985) for theoretical models), unfortunately, there has been no systematic empirical analysis so far in the literature that provides guidance to decision makers regarding the right way to communicate adverse private information to the equity market. 2 The objective of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature by providing the first empirical analysis of a firm's choice between preparing and not preparing the market before a dividend cut and the consequences of market preparation.
We address the above issue by examining several questions in this paper. First, we analyze the characteristics of firms that prepare the market before a dividend cut versus those that do not do such market preparation. Second, we examine the implications of a firm preparing or not preparing the market for the announcement effect on the market preparation days as well as on the day of the dividend cut announcement. Third, we analyze how a firm preparing or not preparing the market relates to its stock return volatility after the dividend cut. Finally, we examine how operating performance, dividend payment, institutional equity holdings, and stock returns after the dividend cut differ across prepared and nonprepared dividend cutters. The results of the above analyses help us to better understand how firms optimally choose to communicate negative private information to the equity market before a potential dividend cut.
In a recent paper, Chemmanur and Tian (2012) develop a signaling model that analyzes a firm's decision regarding whether to prepare the market before a dividend cut. They consider a setting in which there are three types of firms with only insiders observing firm types to begin with (i.e., firm insiders have private information about long-run intrinsic value). High intrinsic value firms have no significant chance of being in short-run financial difficulties and have high longrun growth prospects, medium intrinsic value firms have a significant chance of being in short-run financial difficulties (and, therefore, having to cut their dividends) but have high long-run growth prospects, and low intrinsic value firms have a significant chance of being in short-run financial difficulties (and having to cut their dividends) and have low long-run growth prospects. In the above setting, Chemmanur and Tian show that, in equilibrium, high intrinsic value firms do not prepare the market for a dividend cut at all; medium intrinsic value firms prepare the market with a high probability; and low intrinsic value firms prepare the market with a significantly lower probability than medium intrinsic value firms. Note that preparing the market is the mechanism through which medium intrinsic value firms separate themselves from low intrinsic value firms in the event of a dividend cut: the signal is made credible due to the fact that market preparation separates them from high intrinsic value firms, causing them to suffer a negative stock market reaction on the market preparation day. We rely on the implications of Chemmanur and Tian primarily to generate hypotheses for our empirical tests. We will refer to the above theory as the "signaling through market preparation" theory.
While we are not aware of any formal model other than that of Chemmanur and Tian (2012) that analyzes market preparation by firms before dividend cuts, we propose an alternative to the above theory, which we will refer to as the "stock return volatility reduction" theory. The basic assumptions underlying this theory are that i) there is no difference in long-run intrinsic value between prepared and nonprepared dividend cutters, and ii) market preparation is simply a means adopted by some firms to split up the release of information over multiple days, in an attempt to reduce the firms' stock return volatility in the months immediately after a dividend cut. While some of the predictions of this alternative theory are similar to those of the signaling through market preparation theory, its other predictions are different from those of the signaling theory, allowing us to empirically distinguish between the above two theories (we discuss the implications of the two theories in Section III).
Using a hand-collected data set of dividend cutting firms, which allows us to distinguish between firms that prepared the market before a dividend cut and those that did not do so (we are also able to identify cases of firms that prepared the market multiple times), we test the hypotheses generated by the above two theories and develop a number of new findings. First, we find that firms with poorer current profitability but higher long-term growth opportunities are more likely to prepare the market before potential dividend cuts. We also find that firms are less likely to prepare the market during years of economic recessions when long-term growth prospects are poorer. These findings are consistent with the predictions of the signaling theory.
Second, we find a significantly negative cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for firms preparing the market on the first market preparation day. A firm preparing the market, on average, experiences a −3.2% CAR in the [−1, +1] event window around the first market preparation day. However, we do not find significant CARs in the subsequent market preparation days. Meanwhile, the announcement effect of firms cutting dividends after market preparation is indeed less negative than that of firms cutting dividends without such market preparation. The announcement effect of a prepared dividend cutter is less negative by about 5.1% than that of a nonprepared cutter in the [−1, +1] event window around the dividend cut announcement day. Even when combining the stock market reactions of prepared dividend cutters (the sum of market reactions on all the market preparation days and the dividend cut announcement day) and comparing those with the announcement effects of nonprepared dividend cutters, prepared dividend cutters still experience a 3.4% less negative CAR than nonprepared dividend cutters in the [−1, +1] event window, suggesting that prepared dividend cutters are not simply "splitting up" the negative news over separate event days. The first two findings above are consistent with the predictions of both the signaling theory and the volatility reduction theory. However, the last finding is consistent only with the signaling theory and not the volatility reduction theory.
Third, we find that the stock return volatility of prepared dividend cutters is lower than that of nonprepared dividend cutters in the quarters subsequent to a dividend cut. This finding is consistent with the predictions of both the signaling theory and the volatility reduction theory.
Fourth, we show that the long-term operating performance of prepared dividend cutters is significantly better than that of nonprepared dividend cutters. We also find that prepared dividend cutters increase dividends more than nonprepared cutters in the years following a dividend cut. Furthermore, in the years after a dividend cut, the percentage ownership by institutional investors in prepared dividend cutters is significantly larger than that in nonprepared dividend cutters, and the number of institutional investors investing in prepared dividend cutters is also greater than that in nonprepared cutters. Finally, we show that the long-term stock return performance of prepared dividend cutters is better than that of nonprepared dividend cutters. The above findings provide support for the signaling theory but not for the volatility reduction theory.
Overall, what do we learn from our empirical analysis about the right way for firms to communicate adverse private information to the equity market before a dividend cut? Our analysis suggests that it may be optimal for firms in temporary financial difficulties but with better long-term growth prospects to signal this to the equity market by preparing the market for a possible dividend cut. Furthermore, our comparison of long-term operating, dividend payment, institutional equity holdings, and stock return performance of prepared versus nonprepared dividend cutters after dividend cuts suggests that market preparation before a dividend cut is not really a good way for firms to reduce stock return volatility by splitting up adverse information over time. This is the first paper in the literature that empirically examines a firm's strategy of market preparation before adverse corporate events in general, and a dividend cut in particular.
3 However, there is a small amount of empirical literature on the timing of dividend announcements, which is related to our paper (see, e.g., Kalay and Loewenstein (1986) , who show that late announcements of dividends are disproportionately associated with bad news (dividend reductions)). Our paper is also distantly related to the large literature analyzing the relation between dividend changes and omissions and subsequent operating performance, as well as the literature on the information content of dividend changes (see, e.g., Watts (1973) , Aharony and Swary (1980) , Kalay (1980) , Asquith and Mullins (1983) , and Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we discuss our data and sample selection procedures. We discuss our testable hypotheses and empirical design in Section III. In Section IV, we present our empirical results. We discuss extensions of our empirical analysis and robustness tests in Section V. Section VI concludes.
II. Data and Sample Selection
The data used in this study come from several different databases. We collect a sample consisting of firms that reduced (or omitted) their cash dividends between 1982 and 2006 from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. The sample period ends in 2006 to allow for the availability of data about dividend cutting firms' stock return volatility, operating performance, dividend payout, stock return, and institutional ownership 4 years subsequent to a dividend cut from various databases. Each observation in the sample satisfies the following criteria: i) The firm's stock return as well as financial information is available from the CRSP database and Compustat files, ii) the distribution is a quarterly cash dividend in U.S. dollars, iii) the cash dividend change is greater than 12.5% to ensure that we include only economically significant dividend decreases, iv) the cash dividend is not paid out by financial institutions, v) the firm is publicly traded, and vi) there is at least an interval of 1 year between two successive dividend cuts by the same firm. The first five criteria are standard in the literature; the last criterion is required because we want to test the effects of market preparations for dividend cuts and need to have a long enough "window" to isolate the effect of any previous dividend cuts. The maximum dividend decrease in our sample is 100% (dividend omissions).
Similar to the methodology adopted by Dyck and Zingales (2003) and Bhattacharya, Galpin, Ray, and Yu (2009) , we hand collect data about market preparations for dividend cuts by searching for news articles from 1 year to 30 days before the dividend cut announcement date from Factiva (formerly Dow Jones News Retrieval Service) using key strings of "dividend cuts," "restructuring," "financial strategy," "conserve cash," "dividend omissions," "spokesman (spokeswoman)," and "customer relations." We classify the firm as a prepared dividend cutter if there is any information released by firm insiders about a potential dividend cut at least 30 days before the formal dividend cut announcement date (but no formal dividend cut is actually announced); otherwise, the firm is classified as a nonprepared dividend cutter. We record the news release (public announcement) date available from Factiva and call it the "public preparation date." If the firm prepares the market multiple times through public announcements, we record all their public preparation dates.
Dividend cutting firms may also prepare the market through their filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). To collect this information, we manually check all dividend cutting firms' 10-K and 10-Q statements from the Thomson One, SEC Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system, and LexisNexis databases. For firms that cut dividends between 1982 and 1994, we collect their SEC filing data from Thomson One, which contains scanned paper versions of firms' SEC filings back to the 1970s. For firms that cut dividends between 1995 and 2006, we collect their SEC filings data from SEC EDGAR, which contains electronic versions of firms' SEC filings. For firms for which we cannot find SEC filings information from either Thomson One or SEC EDGAR, we search the LexisNexis database. We are able to identify 10 dividend cutting firms that release their intentions of cutting dividends in their 10-K or 10-Q filings with the SEC. We record their SEC form filing dates and call them "SEC preparation dates." We cross-check these 10 firms with the identities of dividend cutting firms that prepare the market through public announcements. We find that they all prepare the market (through public announcements) before their SEC filings in which they release their intentions of cutting dividends (i.e., their first public preparation dates are before their SEC preparation dates).
To ensure that our findings are not contaminated by announcements of other corporate events, we remove from our sample those firms that make other important announcements (e.g., earnings warnings, chief executive officer (CEO) turnover) 30 days before and after the public preparation date and the SEC preparation date, 30 days before the dividend cut announcement date, and anytime between the first market preparation date and the dividend cut announcement date. The resulting sample contains 401 announcements of dividend cuts. Out of these 401 announcements of dividend cuts, 93 are coded as prepared dividend cuts and the remaining 308 are coded as nonprepared dividend cuts. Dividend cuts with market preparation account for 23.2% of all dividend cuts in our sample period, which suggests that market preparation for dividend cuts is a fairly common phenomenon.
Panel A of Table 1 reports the distribution of the sample by dividend cutting year. The table presents the number of total and prepared dividend cuts, as well as the proportion of prepared dividend cuts. Compared to the number of dividend cuts across years reported in column 1, which is relatively volatile, the number of prepared dividend cuts reported in column 3 is quite stable over time. Column 5 highlights a generally increasing trend in market preparation for dividend cuts in the latter half of the sample: 100% of dividend cutting firms prepare the market in 2000, and 50% of dividend cutting firms prepare the market in 1995 and 2002; only 6% of dividend cutting firms prepare the market in 1982, and this ratio is 0 in 1984.
4 Column 6 reports the distribution of dividend cut preparations through SEC filings. It mainly concentrates on the period from 1994 to 2003 with no SEC preparations observed in other periods.
To examine whether dividend cuts are concentrated in a small sample of firms, Panel B of Table 1 presents the frequency distribution of repeated dividend cutting firms. The 401 dividend cuts are made by 342 unique dividend cutting firms. Column 1 shows that 288 firms cut dividends one time, 50 firms cut dividends two times, 3 firms cut dividends three times, and 1 firm cut dividends four times in our sample period. Regarding prepared dividend cutting firms, the 93 prepared dividend cuts are made by 85 unique firms. Among them, as reported in column 2, 77 prepared cutting firms cut dividends one time and 8 prepared cutting firms cut dividends two times.
Panel C of Table 1 reports the industry distribution of unique dividend cutting firms to examine whether dividend cuts are concentrated in certain industries. We classify firms into 1 of 12 Fama-French industries (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/ pages/faculty/ken.french/Data Library/det 12 ind port.html). Since financial institutions are excluded from our sample based on the sample selection criteria described above, dividend cutting firms in the sample are distributed over the . Column 1 presents the number of total dividend cuts in each year. Column 2 presents the percentage of dividend cuts in each year. Column 3 presents the number of dividend cuts with market preparation in each year. Column 4 presents the percentage of prepared dividend cuts in each year. Column 5 reports prepared dividend cuts as the percentage of total dividend cuts in each year. Column 6 reports the number of market preparation through SEC filings. The dividend data are obtained from CRSP. Market preparation and SEC preparation data are hand collected from Factiva, Thomson One, SEC EDGAR, and LexisNexis. Panel B reports the summary statistics for the frequency distribution of all dividend cutters as well as prepared dividend cutters who cut their dividends multiple times in the sample period. Panel C reports the summary statistics for the industry distribution of all dividend cutters as well as prepared dividend cutters in the sample period. Panel D reports the summary statistics for the frequency distribution of prepared dividend cutters' preparation through public announcements and SEC filings in the sample period. remaining 11 industries. For example, in the Chemicals industry, 17 dividend cut announcements are made by 13 unique dividend cutting firms and 5 prepared dividend cut announcements are made by 4 unique prepared dividend cutting firms. As reported in column 2, the 342 unique dividend cutting firms are spread out across all 11 industries. Manufacturing, Utilities, and Retail are the top 3 industries to which dividend cutting firms belong. Regarding prepared dividend cutting firms, column 4 shows that the above 3 industries remain the top industries to which prepared dividend cutting firms belong, and 41.2% (35 out of 85) of prepared dividend cutting firms are from the Utilities industry. Since a few dividend cutting firms prepare the market (through either public announcements or SEC filings) multiple times, Panel D of Table 1 reports the frequency distribution of market preparation for these dividend cuts. Column 1 presents the frequency distribution of dividend cuts with multiple preparations through public announcements for a given dividend cut. While 63.4% (59 out of 93 dividend cuts) of dividend cuts prepare the market through public announcements one time, 19 prepare the market two times, 11 prepare the market three times, 2 prepare the market four times, and 2 prepare the market five times. Regarding market preparation through SEC filings, among 10 prepared dividend cuts, 6 release their intention of cutting dividends through SEC filings one time and 4 do so two times.
We obtain information on stock returns from the CRSP database, accounting information from Compustat, analyst forecast information from Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (IBES), institutional ownership data from the Thomson Financial 13F database, and business cycle information from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Web site (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). We construct variables for firms' profitability, size, growth opportunity, leverage, payout ratio, investment, asset tangibility, stock return volatility, information asymmetry, and institutional ownership following the standard procedures in the literature. The constructions and sources of variables used in this paper are discussed in the Appendix. Table 2 reports the summary statistics and univariate comparisons across the two categories of dividend cutters. Prepared dividend cutters, on average, prepare the market 111 days prior to the formal dividend cut announcement. Prepared dividend cutters cut their dividend, on average, 6.8% more than nonprepared cutters, although the difference is not statistically significant. This finding suggests that our results from comparing prepared and nonprepared dividend cutters are unlikely due to those two groups of firms having systematically different magnitudes of dividend cuts. To further address this concern, we control for the percentage of dividend cuts in our multivariate regression analysis. The results in Table 2 also suggest that prepared dividend cutters are larger firms with a higher dividend yield, a higher subsequent growth rate of sales, and a higher leverage level. Prepared dividend cutters also have a larger number of institutional investors compared to their counterparts. While we observe that 4% of prepared dividend cutters cut dividends in the years during an economic recession, a larger proportion of nonprepared dividend cutters (i.e., 16%) cut dividends in the years during an economic recession. However, these two groups of firms do not appear to be different in other characteristics (e.g., profitability, asset tangibility, degrees of information asymmetry, and investments in tangible as well as intangible assets).
III. Hypotheses and Empirical Design
A. Hypothesis Development Chemmanur and Tian (2012) develop a signaling model that analyzes a firm's decision regarding whether to prepare the market before a dividend cut. They show that, in equilibrium, high intrinsic value firms do not prepare the market for a dividend cut at all, medium intrinsic value firms prepare the market with a high probability, and low intrinsic value firms prepare the market with a significantly lower probability than medium intrinsic value firms. Based on the implications of their model, we formulate the following testable hypotheses: Hypothesis 1. Propensity to Prepare the Market. Firms with poorer current profitability but greater future growth opportunities are more likely to prepare the market. Firms are less likely to prepare the market during recessions, since longterm growth prospects will be poorer during recessions.
Hypothesis 2. Announcement Effect on Market Preparation Days.
The announcement effect on the first market preparation day will be negative. The announcement effect on subsequent market preparation days will be 0.
Hypothesis 3. Announcement Effect on Dividend Cut Announcement Days.
While the announcement effect will be negative for both prepared and nonprepared dividend cutters, the announcement effect for prepared dividend cutters will be less negative compared to that of nonprepared dividend cutters.
Hypothesis 4. The Combined Announcement Effect on Market Preparation Days and the Dividend Cut Announcement Day.
The combined announcement effect for prepared dividend cutters will be less negative than the dividend cut announcement effect for nonprepared dividend cutters. Hypothesis 5. Stock Return Volatility Subsequent to Dividend Cuts. The stock return volatility in the short and medium term subsequent to a dividend cut will be lower for prepared dividend cutters than for nonprepared dividend cutters. Hypothesis 6. Long-Term Operating Performance, Dividend Payment, and Institutional Ownership. The long-term operating performance and dividend payment of firms subsequent to a dividend cut will be better for prepared dividend cutters than nonprepared cutters. If we add the additional assumption that institutional investors are better at detecting higher long-run intrinsic value firms than retail investors (Allen et al. (2000) ), equity holdings by institutional investors will be greater for prepared cutters than that for nonprepared cutters after a dividend cut. Hypothesis 7. Long-Term Stock Return Performance. The long-term stock return performance subsequent to a dividend cut will be better for prepared than for nonprepared dividend cutters.
While we are not aware of any formal alternative model to Chemmanur and Tian (2012) that explains market preparation by dividend cutting firms, we now briefly propose a simple alternative theory to the signaling through market preparation theory, which we refer to as the stock return volatility reduction theory. We will use this theory to develop and test alternative explanations to the signaling theory for market preparation by dividend cutting firms.
Consider a setting in which the CEO of a firm with risk-averse shareholders is contemplating a dividend cut, since he assesses that his firm is likely to experience temporary financial difficulties. The CEO is aware that a significant proportion of the firm's shareholders are not fully diversified and, therefore, care about the volatility of their equity holdings in the firm. In this setting, the CEO, whose objective is to maximize shareholder welfare, has an incentive to prepare the market to release the information about his firm's temporary financial difficulties slowly through time and, thus, reduce stock return volatility upon an actual dividend cut. Therefore, the crucial distinction between the signaling theory and the volatility reduction theory is that there is no strategic motive behind the release of information under the latter theory, that is, no relation between firm quality (intrinsic value) and the propensity to prepare the market.
In the above discussion, we used a CEO's desire to explicitly reduce stock return volatility for the early release of information (market preparation) under the volatility reduction theory. However, another possibility is that some firms have strict disclosure policies under their corporate governance rules, which require firm management to periodically release any value-relevant information without delay. In terms of changes in dividend policy, this implies that firm management will release any information relevant to possible changes in dividend policy early, which will manifest itself as market preparation. 6 The prediction of the volatility reduction theory would be the same even under this alternative motivation for the early release of information about a possible dividend cut.
for prepared dividend cutters than for nonprepared cutters. Thus, the above three predictions are similar under both the volatility reduction theory and the signaling theory.
There are, however, two important predictions that are different across the signaling theory and the volatility reduction theory, which allow us to conduct empirical tests to distinguish between the above two theories. First, while the signaling theory predicts that the combined announcement effect over the market preparation days and the dividend cut day will be lower for prepared than for nonprepared dividend cutters, the volatility reduction theory predicts that it will be similar for prepared versus nonprepared dividend cutters. This is because, under the volatility reduction theory, there is no difference in long-run intrinsic value between prepared and nonprepared dividend cutters (since there is no strategic motive underlying market preparation), and the only objective of market preparation is the release of adverse information to the equity market over time to reduce stock return volatility at the time of the dividend cut (and immediately after). The next prediction relates to the long-term operating performance, dividend payment, institutional holdings, and stock return performance. One would not expect to see any difference in the above four variables across prepared and nonprepared dividend cutters under the volatility reduction theory. This is because, under this theory, firm management is driven purely by a desire to reduce the volatility in shareholder wealth when they prepare the market and not by any private information they have about their firm's long-run future performance.
B. Empirical Design
We now discuss our empirical methods and models that we estimate in Section IV. We first test Hypothesis 1 by running a linear probability model with the market preparation dummy, Market Preparation, as the dependent variable. Market Preparation equals 1 for a prepared dividend cut and 0 for a nonprepared dividend cut. We are interested in how a firm's growth opportunity, current profitability, and general business cycle affect its propensity to prepare the market. Therefore, we construct three variables to capture them. First, we use the 3-year average growth in sales subsequent to a dividend cut, Sales growth, as a proxy for a firm's future growth opportunity. Second, we use a firm's return on assets, ROA, during the dividend cut year as a proxy for its current profitability. Third, we construct a recession dummy, Recession dummy, that equals 1 if the dividend cut occurs in a year when the economy is in a recession according to the NBER definition and 0 otherwise to capture general macroeconomic conditions.
We include a vector of control variables, Control, that controls for various other firm characteristics including firm size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, asset tangibility, payout ratio, investment in tangible and intangible assets, stock return volatility, information asymmetry, and institutional ownership. We include year fixed effects to account for variations over time associated with market movements that may influence a firm's propensity to prepare the market. Since about 40% (113 out of 401) of dividend cuts are from repeated dividend cutters, we have unbalanced panel data and a dividend cutting firm may appear in the sample multiple times. Therefore, we include firm fixed effects to absorb any time-invariant 
where i indexes firm and t indexes time. If Hypothesis 1 is supported, we expect to observe a positive coefficient estimate of β 1 and negative coefficient estimates of β 2 and β 3 . Next, we test Hypotheses 2-4 by studying equity market reactions to market preparations for dividend cuts and the announcement effect of dividend cuts. The equity market reactions for each dividend cut are computed as the CARs for a particular window around the event day (market preparation day or dividend cut announcement day). Daily abnormal returns are computed using the market model for both equal-weighted and value-weighted CRSP indices. Market model parameters are estimated over 255 trading days ending 46 trading days before the market preparation with at least 100 nonmissing daily returns in the estimation period. Equity market price reactions are calculated for four different event [−3, 0] , and [−3, +3], for each market index ranging from 3 days before to 3 days after the event day. The market preparation date is taken to be all the dates when either firms prepare the market through a public announcement or firms release their intentions to cut dividends in their SEC filings.
Finally, we further test and distinguish between the predictions of the signaling theory and the volatility reduction theory by examining the long-term performance of prepared and nonprepared dividend cutters subsequent to a dividend cut. Specifically, we test Hypotheses 5 and 6 by estimating the following model using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions:
where i indexes firm, t indexes time, and j indexes industry. The dependent variable, Performance, can be one of the following long-term performance variables: stock return volatility, operating performance, dividend payout, or institutional ownership. The key variable of interest is Market Preparation, which is the same as we defined before. Notice that the coefficient estimate of Market Preparation should not be interpreted as a causal effect of preparing the market for a possible dividend cut on firm subsequent performance. Instead, it captures the expected differences (due to unobservable firm characteristics) in the long-term performance between prepared and nonprepared dividend cutting firms. We cluster standard errors by dividend cutting firms. We will discuss the empirical methodology testing Hypothesis 7 regarding the long-term stock return performance of prepared versus nonprepared dividend cutters in more detail in Section IV.D.
IV. Empirical Results

A. Propensity to Prepare the Market
We first study the dividend cutting firm's propensity to prepare the market before the dividend cut and test Hypothesis 1. The hypothesis argues that firms with greater future growth opportunities are more likely to prepare the market before cutting dividends, while those with higher current profitability are less likely to prepare the market. It also argues that firms are less likely to prepare the market in years of economic recession. Table 3 reports the linear probability regression results. Column 1 presents how a firm's growth opportunity and current profitability affect its propensity to Table 3 presents the linear probability regression results estimating equation (1) with the market preparation dummy as the dependent variable. Definitions of all variables are reported in the Appendix. Year and firm fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors clustered by dividend cutting firms are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. prepare the market before a dividend cut. The coefficient estimate of β 1 is positive and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that the higher a firm's future growth opportunity, as captured by its subsequent sales growth rate, the higher its propensity to prepare the market. The coefficient estimate of β 2 is negative and significant at the 10% level, suggesting that the lower the firm's current profitability, the higher the firm's propensity to prepare the market. Column 2 reports the regression results that examine how business cycles affect a firm's propensity to prepare the market. The coefficient estimate of β 3 is negative and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that firms are 24% less likely to prepare the market if the general economy is in a recession. In column 3, we include all three variables of interest together and continue to observe both quantitatively and qualitatively similar results. As a robustness check, in an untabulated analysis, we use a logit model with the same specification except that we replace firm fixed effects with industry fixed effects.
8 We obtain qualitatively similar results. Overall, our findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1.
B. Announcement Effect
In this section, we examine equity market reactions to market preparations for dividend cuts and the announcement effect of dividend cuts. We test three hypotheses: Hypothesis 2 states that the stock price of a firm drops upon the first market preparation for a dividend cut but does not drop upon subsequent market preparations. Hypothesis 3 states that the announcement effect of a prepared dividend cut will be more favorable (less negative) than a nonprepared dividend cut. Hypothesis 4 states that the combined announcement effect of a prepared dividend cut on all market preparation days and the dividend cut announcement day will be less negative than the dividend cut announcement effect for a nonprepared dividend cut. Table 4 reports the CAR results on the market preparation days. Since dividend cutting firms prepare the market up to five times through public announcements and up to two times through SEC filings before a dividend cut, we report CARs separately for each of these market preparation days. Panel A reports the results with the equal-weighted CRSP index as the benchmark. We observe that the stock price drops significantly upon the first market preparation for a dividend cut. On average, the CARs are −3.2% in the [−1, +1] event window and −3.7% in the [−3, +3] event window. However, the CARs have mixed signs on the second through fifth market preparation days. Although the sample size dramatically shrinks as fewer firms prepare the market multiple times for a given dividend cut and it is hard to draw meaningful statistical inferences from small samples, the magnitudes of CARs are much lower and appear to be indistinguishable from 0 in later market preparations. In the last two columns of Table 4 , we report CARs on the SEC preparation days. Because all firms in our sample prepare the Table 4 reports the equity market price reactions of prepared dividend cutters when they prepare the equity market. The equity market price reaction for each market preparation is computed as the CARs for a particular window around the market preparation day. Daily abnormal returns are computed using the market model for two market indices: equalweighted and value-weighted CRSP indices. Market model parameters are estimated over 255 trading days ending 46 trading days before the market preparation day with at least 100 nonmissing daily returns in the estimation period. Market preparation day is denoted as day 0. Market preparation and SEC preparation data are hand collected from Factiva, Thomson One, SEC EDGAR, and LexisNexis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. market through SEC filings after their first public market announcement (i.e., all SEC preparation dates are after their corresponding firms' first public preparation dates), it is not surprising to observe that the CARs on the SEC preparation days are all indistinguishable from 0. 9 In Panel B, we replace the benchmark for CARs with the value-weighted CRSP index. We find both quantitatively and qualitatively similar results. Overall, the evidence reported in Table 4 supports Hypothesis 2.
Market
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To test Hypothesis 3, we run multivariable regressions with CARs on the dividend cut announcement day as the dependent variable and report the results in Table 5 . The CARs are calculated based on a value-weighted market index. The main variable of interest is Market Preparation. We control for the size of the dividend cut, Dividend cut percentage, and other firm characteristics that are shown to affect CARs on the dividend announcement day. The coefficient estimates of Market Preparation are positive and significant at the 1% level in all four event windows, suggesting that prepared dividend cutters have more favorable (less negative) announcement effects than nonprepared cutters on the 9 Once again, because the sample sizes are small, we cannot draw meaningful statistical inferences. 10 In an unreported analysis, we run regressions to examine the effects of firm characteristics on the CARs on the first market preparation day. Firms with lower ROA, higher market-to-book ratio, and higher dividend yield experience more negative market reactions. We also include the actual percentage dividend cut in the regressions to examine whether the market correctly anticipates the size of the dividend cut and find its coefficients are not statistically significant. dividend cut announcement day. On average, after controlling for the size of dividend cuts and firm characteristics, prepared dividend cutters experience a 5.1% less negative market reaction in the [−1, +1] event window and a 6.7% less negative reaction in the [−3, +3] event window. Some other findings are also worth noting. The coefficient estimates of Dividend cut percentage are negative and significant at either the 1% or 5% level, suggesting that firms with a larger percentage dividend cut experience a larger drop in their stock returns. For instance, a 10% increase in the size of the dividend cut is associated with a 1.1% larger drop in CARs in the [−3, +3] event window. In an untabulated analysis, we run the same regressions with the dependent variable replaced with the CARs calculated based on the equal-weighted CRSP index. We find quantitatively similar results. Overall, our findings support Hypothesis 3.
Our evidence so far is consistent with the predictions of both the signaling theory of Chemmanur and Tian (2012) and the volatility reduction theory. However, the above two theories have different predictions regarding the combined announcement effect over the market preparation days and the dividend cut day.
While the volatility reduction theory argues that firms prepare the market to simply "split up" the bad news over time to reduce stock return volatility at the time of the dividend cut (and immediately after), the signaling theory suggests that medium intrinsic value firms prepare the market to convey their more favorable private information to the equity market. To distinguish between these two theories, we test Hypothesis 4. The signaling theory predicts that the combined announcement effects on all market preparation days and the dividend cut day for prepared cutters will be less negative than the announcement effect for nonprepared cutters on the dividend cut announcement day. If, however, the prediction of the volatility reduction theory is supported, we should not observe a statistically significant difference between them. We calculate the combined stock market reactions, that is, the sum of market reactions on all market preparation days (both public preparation days and SEC preparation days) and the dividend cut announcement day, for prepared dividend cutters and compare those with the stock market reactions of nonprepared dividend cutters on the dividend cut announcement day. Table 6 reports the regression results with the combined CARs based on a value-weighted CRSP index as the dependent variable. The magnitudes of the coefficient estimates for Market Preparation are smaller than those in Table 5 , which is not surprising, as prepared dividend cutters suffered significant negative abnormal returns when they prepared the market, as reported in Table 4 . However, more importantly, the coefficient estimates of Market Preparation are
TABLE 6
Combined Stock Market Reactions of Market Preparations, SEC Filings, and Dividend Cuts Table 6 reports the regression results of the combined abnormal returns upon the market preparation for dividend cuts and the announcement of dividend cuts. Abnormal returns for each dividend cut are computed as the CARs for a particular window around the market preparation day and the dividend cut announcement day. When there are multiple market preparations through either public announcements or SEC filings, the CAR on the market preparation day is the combined CARs across various market preparations. Daily abnormal returns are computed using the market model for a valueweighted CRSP index. Market model parameters are estimated over 255 trading days ending 46 trading days before the event day with at least 100 nonmissing daily returns in the estimation period. Announcement day is denoted as day 0. Definitions of other variables are reported in the Appendix. Year and Fama-French 49 industry fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. Market preparation and SEC preparation data are hand collected from Factiva, Thomson One, SEC EDGAR, and LexisNexis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. still positive and significant in all four event windows. After controlling for firm characteristics, on average, prepared dividend cutters still experience 2.5%-4% smaller (combined) negative CARs than nonprepared dividend cutters. In an unreported analysis, we perform robustness tests by running all regressions with CARs based on an equal-weighted CRSP index and continue to find both qualitatively and quantitatively similar results. The findings suggest that, even though prepared dividend cutters suffer negative market reactions on the first market preparation day, they still enjoy more favorable (less negative) combined market reactions than nonprepared dividend cutters. The evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 4, the prediction of the signaling theory, but is inconsistent with the prediction of the volatility reduction theory.
C. Long-Term Performance Subsequent to the Dividend Cut
In this section, we further distinguish between the predictions of the signaling theory and those of the volatility reduction theory. We examine the long-term stock return volatility, operating performance, dividend payment, institutional equity holdings, and stock returns of prepared versus nonprepared dividend cutters subsequent to a dividend cut.
Stock Return Volatility
Both the signaling theory and the volatility reduction theory predict that stock return volatility should be reduced subsequent to a dividend cut. In this section, we test this hypothesis, Hypothesis 5, by comparing the stock return volatility of prepared and nonprepared dividend cutters after a dividend cut.
We obtain daily stock return data from CRSP and calculate average stock return volatility based on four event windows: the dividend cut day to 3 months after the dividend cut day [0, +3] , to 6 months after the dividend cut day [0, +6] , to 9 months after the dividend cut day [0, +9], and to 12 months after the dividend cut day [0, +12].
We estimate equation (2) with stock return volatility variables as the dependent variable and report the results in Table 7 . The coefficient estimates of Market Preparation are negative and significant at the 5% or 10% level in all columns, suggesting that prepared dividend cutters have a 0.4% lower stock return volatility compared to nonprepared dividend cutters in the first four quarters after a dividend cut. The evidence supports Hypothesis 5 and is consistent with the predictions of both the signaling theory and the volatility reduction theory.
TABLE 7
Comparisons of Stock Return Volatilities Table 7 reports the OLS regression results estimating equation (2) with stock return volatility up to four quarters after a dividend cut as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered by individual cutting firms are reported in parentheses. Definitions of variables are reported in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. In this section, to distinguish between the predictions of the signaling theory and the volatility reduction theory and to test Hypothesis 6, we explore the long-term operating performance, dividend payout, and institutional ownership of prepared versus nonprepared dividend cutters subsequent to a dividend cut.
The volatility reduction theory suggests that there will not be any differences between the two groups of firms regarding their operating performance, dividend payout, and institutional equity holdings after a dividend cut. This is because, under this theory, managers' market preparation is purely driven by a desire to reduce their firm's stock return volatility and managers of firms preparing the market do not have more favorable private information about their firm's intrinsic value. However, the signaling theory suggests that the operating, dividend payout, and institutional equity holdings of prepared dividend cutters after a dividend cut will be better than those of nonprepared cutters, since market preparation is a signal sent by managers who privately observe that their firms have higher intrinsic value than nonprepared dividend cutters. Therefore, their long-term performance after a dividend cut will be better than that of nonprepared dividend cutters.
We start by examining the long-term operating performance. Table 8 reports the results from estimating equation (2) with 3-year postdividend cut operating (2) with the operating performance measure at the third year after a dividend cut as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered by individual cutting firms are reported in parentheses. The operating performance variables are ROA, EBIT/Assets, and Profit Margin. Definitions of variables are reported in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. performance measures as the dependent variable. We consider three operating performance measures: ROA, earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over book value of firm assets, and profit margin. The coefficient estimates of Market Preparation are positive and significant at the 5% level in all columns. The economic significance is large: the coefficient estimate of Market Preparation in column 1 suggests that prepared dividend cutters have a 3.9% higher ROA than nonprepared cutters 3 years after the cut. These findings suggest that, compared to nonprepared dividend cutters, prepared dividend cutters have better operating performance in the years after a dividend cut. Next, we study how prepared dividend cutters' dividend payout patterns differ from those of nonprepared cutters after a dividend cut. We examine the dividend payout performance up to 4 years after a dividend cut. For each year, we calculate the average dividend change rate. Our calculation of the dividend change rate is based only on ordinary quarterly cash dividends. The average dividend change rate is calculated as the average quarterly dividend change rate within the calendar year after a dividend cut as
We then compute the differences between the average dividend change rate of these two groups of dividend cutters. Table 9 reports the long-term dividend payout results from estimating equation (2) with firms' average dividend change rate as the dependent variable. The coefficient estimate of Market Preparation is positive and insignificant in column 1, suggesting that there is no significant difference in payout performance between the firms in the first year after a dividend cut. However, the coefficient estimates of Market Preparation are positive and significant at the 1% or 5% level in columns 2-4, suggesting that prepared dividend cutters perform better than nonprepared cutters in terms of dividend payout starting from the second year after the cut.
Finally, we examine the long-term institutional holdings of prepared versus nonprepared dividend cutters and test the hypothesis that equity holdings by institutional investors will be larger for prepared dividend cutters than those for nonprepared cutters after a dividend cut. The hypothesis is based on the rationale that institutional investors are better at detecting higher intrinsic value firms compared to retail investors (Allen et al. (2000) ) and that prepared dividend cutters have higher intrinsic value than nonprepared dividend cutters.
We construct two measures for institutional holdings. 11 First, we calculate the institutional investors' holdings as the number of shares held by institutional investors as a fraction of the total number of shares outstanding in the dividend cutting firm reported in CRSP. Second, we count the number of institutional investors investing in the firms. We then take a logarithmic transformation of both variables to facilitate the interpretation of the regression results.
TABLE 9
Long-Term Dividend Payout Performance Table 9 reports the OLS regression results estimating equation (2) with the average dividend payout rate up to 4 years after a dividend cut as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered by individual cutting firms are reported in parentheses. Definitions of variables are reported in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 10 reports the results on institutional investors from estimating equation (2) up to 4 years after the dividend cut year (years 1-4). Panel A presents institutional investors' equity holdings. The coefficient estimates of Market Preparation are all positive and significant at the 1% or 5% level. The coefficient estimate in column 1 suggests that institutional investors hold 48.9% more shares of prepared cutters than nonprepared cutters. In Panel B, we report the results for the number of institutional investors investing in the dividend cutting firms. The coefficient estimates of Market Preparation are all positive and significant at the 5% or 10% level, suggesting that there are a larger number of institutional investors investing in prepared dividend cutters than in nonprepared cutters in all four years (years 1-4) after a dividend cut.
Overall, we compare the long-term operation, dividend payout, and institutional equity holdings of prepared versus nonprepared dividend cutters to distinguish between the predictions of the signaling theory and those of the volatility reduction theory. We find that prepared dividend cutters have better long-term operating performance, increase dividends more, and have larger institutional equity ownership. The evidence is consistent with the predictions of the signaling theory but is inconsistent with those of the volatility reduction theory.
Diagnostic Tests
In Sections IV.C.1 and IV.C.2, we estimate equation (2) and interpret the coefficient estimate of Market Preparation, β 1 , as the effect of market preparation on firms' long-term performance after a dividend cut. However, a key assumption for the above interpretation is that the set of control variables, Control, in equation (2) includes all relevant (to the long-term performance subsequent to the dividend cut and the decision to prepare the market) observable firm characteristics. Hence, β 1 captures the expected differences (due to unobservable firm characteristics) of the long-term performance between prepared and nonprepared dividend cutting firms. To test the above assumption and to provide evidence that Control indeed includes all observable firm characteristics that are important for firms' decision to prepare the market, we perform two diagnostic tests below. First, we run a logit regression estimating equation (1) in the full sample of dividend cutting firms with two important exceptions. i) Instead of using the 3-year average growth in sales subsequent to the dividend cut, we use Past sales growth, the sales growth rate that equals the change rate of sales over the year before the first market preparation year, in the regression. Doing this ensures that our comparison is based on firms' current observable characteristics so that any future differences in performance variables can be attributed to differences in firm unobservables. ii) We include Fama-French 49 industry fixed effects instead of firm fixed effects. Including industry fixed effects allows us to compare firms within the same industry, which controls for any effects of industry heterogeneity on firms' long-term performance after the dividend cut.
We present the logit regression estimates in column 1 of Table 11 . 12 The results show that the logit regression captures a significant amount of variation in the choice variable, Market Preparation, as indicated by a pseudo-R 2 of 30.6% and a p-value from the χ 2 test of the overall model fitness well below 0.001. The second diagnostic test is based on a matched sample that uses the predicted probabilities, or propensity scores, obtained from the coefficients estimated Table 11 reports the diagnostic tests. Column 1 presents the parameter estimates from the logit model regressions based on the entire dividend cutting firm sample. Column 2 presents the parameter estimates of the logit model based on the subsample of prepared and matched nonprepared dividend cutters. Besides all independent variables in column 1, column 2 includes the lagged variables of all independent variables in column 1. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. Definitions of variables are reported in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. from the previous logit regression and performs nearest-neighbor propensity-score matching. Specifically, we match each prepared dividend cutter with a nonprepared cutter with the closest propensity score without replacement. We are able to obtain 82 unique pairs of matched firms.
After obtaining a sample of matched firms, to check whether the set of control variables, Control, in equation (2) includes all observable firm characteristics that are relevant to the decision to prepare the market before a dividend cut, we conduct a diagnostic test by rerunning the logit regression restricted to the matched sample (i.e., 164 observations from 82 pairs of unique matches). In addition to all matching variables used in the first logit regression, in the spirit of a test of overidentified restrictions, we include lagged variables of these firm characteristics in the diagnostic regression. We suppress the coefficient estimates of these lagged variables for brevity. We report the postmatch logit estimates in column 2 of Table 11 . We observe that none of the matching variables and their lagged terms is statistically significant. Also, none of the year dummies and industry dummies is statistically significant in the postmatch logit regression, whereas a majority of them are statistically significant in the prematch regression reported in column 1. 13 In addition, the pseudo-R 2 drops dramatically from 30.6% prior to the matching to 7.4% after the matching, and the χ 2 test for overall model fitness suggests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all of the coefficient estimates of independent variables are 0 (with a p-value of 0.49).
Overall, the above two diagnostic tests suggest that equation (2) includes all relevant observable firm characteristics that are important for firms' decision to prepare the market. Therefore, the estimated coefficient of Market Preparation captures the expected difference of the long-term performance of two groups of firms that are likely to cut dividends: the ones that prepare the market for the possible dividend cut and those that do not prepare the market.
Stock Returns
Finally, we test Hypothesis 7 by examining the long-term stock returns of prepared versus nonprepared dividend cutters after a dividend cut, based on a sample of prepared dividend cutters with matched nonprepared cutters selected from the procedure described in Section IV.C.3.
14 We use the standard calendartime portfolio approach advocated by Fama (1998) , which avoids potential biases for long-term CARs. We compare the intercepts (α) of the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model augmented by a momentum factor (Carhart (1997) ) based on the calendar-time monthly portfolio returns of these two groups of firms. Factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French's data library available from the following Web site: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/. We construct the calendar-time portfolio returns by averaging monthly returns of firms that cut dividends within 48 months of the dividend cut date. We present the results for both equal-and event-weighted calendar periods and for both equal-and valueweighted return portfolios.
Panel A of Table 12 reports stock return results for prepared and nonprepared dividend cutters with equal-weighted portfolios using the OLS regressions. The alphas are not statistically significant for either group, although prepared dividend cutters have a positive α while nonprepared cutters have a negative α. Panel B reports the results with equal-weighted portfolios using the weighted least squares (WLS) regressions based on the number of dividend cuts in the monthly portfolio. While the α of prepared cutters is still positive and insignificant, that of nonprepared cutters is negative and significant at the 5% level. The results suggest that a nonprepared dividend cutter portfolio underperforms the market by 0.7% on a monthly basis. Panel C reports the results with value-weighted portfolios using the OLS regressions, and Panel D reports the results with value-weighted portfolios using the WLS regressions. In both cases, the α of prepared cutters is positive and significant while that of nonprepared cutters is negative and statistically insignificant. Overall, the evidence suggests that prepared dividend cutters enjoy higher long-term stock returns compared to nonprepared dividend cutters after a dividend cut, consistent with Hypothesis 7.
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In summary, in Section IV.C, we find that long-term stock return volatility, operating performance, dividend payout, institutional ownership, and stock return performance of prepared dividend cutters subsequent to a dividend cut are better than those of nonprepared dividend cutters. The evidence is consistent with the implication of the signaling theory but is inconsistent with that of the volatility reduction theory.
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TABLE 12
Long-Term Stock Return Performance Table 12 reports the time-series regression of postdividend monthly percentage returns of prepared and matched nonprepared dividend cutters using the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model augmented by a momentum factor:
where R pt is the return on the portfolio of sample firms in month t; R mt is the return on the value-weighted index of New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ stocks in month t; R ft is the 1-month T-bill yield in month t; and SMB t , HML t , and UMD t are factors described in Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) . The sample period is Jan. 1982 to Dec. 2006 (300 months), and sample firm returns are included in a particular monthly portfolio if the firm's dividend cut date occurred within the last 48 months. Panel A reports results from equal-weighted returns using the OLS. Panel B reports results from value-weighted returns (with value measured as the sample firms' month-end market capitalization in the month prior to the portfolio formation) using the WLS based on the number of dividend cuts in the monthly portfolio. Panel C reports results from value-weighted returns using the OLS. Panel D reports results from value-weighted returns using the WLS. Parameter estimates are presented with standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
V. Extensions and Robustness
In this section, we discuss extensions to our empirical analysis by examining prepared nondividend cutters. We also check whether any potential survivorship bias drives our results.
A. Prepared Nondividend Cutters
We now briefly discuss firms that prepare the market for a possible dividend cut but eventually do not cut the dividend ("prepared nondividend cutters" from now on). Since, in the model of Chemmanur and Tian (2012) , prepared nondividend cutters are more likely to be the medium intrinsic value firms than are the prepared dividend cutters, the model makes two clear predictions about this type of firm. First, it predicts that these firms will have a negative announcement effect on the market preparation days (similar to prepared dividend cutters). Second, it predicts that the long-term operating performance of prepared nondividend cutters will be better than that of the prepared dividend cutters (which, in turn, will be better than that of the nonprepared dividend cutters, as we have already established empirically).
Obviously, the data collection strategy we have adopted to compare the performance of prepared and nonprepared dividend cutters, namely, starting with dividend cutting firms and looking backward and searching for news articles and SEC filings to determine whether they prepared the market, will not help us to create a sample of prepared nondividend cutters. This is because, in this case, there is no conditioning event such as a dividend cut to reduce to a manageable number the sample of firms that we have to search for news articles and SEC filings. Therefore, we are unable to undertake a systematic empirical analysis comparing prepared nondividend cutters to prepared dividend cutters. However, as a case study, we identified 11 firms as prepared nondividend cutters through a random search of the universe of firms. As our sample of prepared nondividend cutters is small, we cannot conclude any meaningful inferences if we conduct univariate or multivariate analyses based on the above sample. However, it is worth reporting that, as expected, the announcement effects on the first market preparation day of prepared nondividend cutters are indeed all negative and their operating performance is considerably better than that of prepared dividend cutters, in the year of market preparation as well as in subsequent years. We now present two illustrations of firms that prepared the market for a dividend cut but, in fact, did not cut their dividends.
AT&T: AT&T (American Telephone & Telegraph (Dallas, TX))) prepared the market for a possible dividend cut on March 21, 1984. Mr. Charles Brown, Chairman of AT&T, said that ". . . announcement of a 30-cent dividend for the first quarter of 1984 is the fulfillment of a commitment rather than a declaration of future dividend policies and I am obliged to be clear about that to our investors. . . . We do not expect to earn at this dividend level in the first quarter." However, AT&T neither prepared the market again nor cut the dividend subsequently. AT&T experienced a negative market reaction on the market preparation day. AT&T's CAR was −6.4% in the [−1, +1] event window based on a value-weighted market index. However, AT&T's operating performance in the subsequent 5 years was much better than even the best performing prepared dividend cutters. For example, AT&T's ROA in subsequent years was in the range of 40%-47%, while the highest ROA of prepared dividend cutters was 28% and the ROA for the average prepared dividend cutter was only about 10%-12%, as reported in Table 9 .
Entergy Corporation: Entergy (New Orleans, LA) prepared the market on Dec. 4, 1995 as management indicated "a possible dividend cut," but it neither prepared the market again nor cut the dividend subsequently. The equity market reaction upon Entergy's announcement was negative: It experienced a CAR of −5.8% in the [−1, +1] event window based on a value-weighted market index. However, Entergy's average profit margin in subsequent years was 28.9%, which was higher than that of the average prepared dividend cutters (i.e., 24%), as reported in Table 9 .
B. Survivorship Bias
A common criticism of long-term performance research is that the study is subject to potential survivorship bias. About 10% of firms disappear in a single year in the CRSP/Compustat databases (Welch (2008) ). Since many of our tests focus on dividend cutters' long-term performance after a dividend cut, we examine whether our sample is subject to survivorship bias. We first identify a group of nonsurviving dividend cutting firms in our sample. A dividend cutter is defined as a nonsurviving firm if it is delisted within 4 years after a dividend cut for reasons due to liquidation (CRSP delisting code DLSTCD between 400 and 499 or between 520 and 600). 17 There are 14 dividend cutting firms in our sample that were delisted due to liquidation within 4 years. Since only a total of 4.1% (14 out of 342 dividend cutting firms) of dividend cutters are nonsurviving firms in our sample across a span of 25 years, compared with 10% of firms delisted in a single year in the CRSP/Compustat databases, survivorship bias is unlikely to be a significant concern in our study.
VI. Conclusion
This paper has presented the first empirical analysis of the choice of firms regarding whether to release private information (i.e., preparing the market) to the equity market in advance of a possible dividend cut and the consequences of such a release. We use a hand-collected data set of dividend cutting firms that allows us to distinguish between prepared and nonprepared dividend cutting firms and to test the implications of two alternative theories: the signaling through market preparation theory and the stock return volatility reduction theory. Our empirical analysis provides a number of new findings.
We first show that firms that have poorer current profitability but higher longterm growth opportunities are more likely to prepare the market prior to dividend cuts. Second, the abnormal stock returns of firms preparing the market for a dividend cut are negative on the first market preparation day but are insignificant on subsequent market preparation days. The abnormal stock returns upon the announcement of a dividend cut are less negative for prepared than for nonprepared dividend cutters. Even though we combine the market reactions of prepared dividend cutters on all market preparation days and the dividend cut announcement day and compare those with the announcement effects of nonprepared dividend cutters, prepared dividend cutters still experience a less negative market reaction than nonprepared dividend cutters. Third, prepared dividend cutters experience a larger reduction in stock return volatility than nonprepared dividend cutters subsequent to a dividend cut. Finally, the long-term operating performance, dividend payout, institutional equity holdings, and stock return performance of prepared dividend cutters are better than those of nonprepared dividend cutters.
While our empirical analysis is conducted only in the context of dividend cuts, it has potential implications for communicating adverse information to the equity market in the context of other corporate events as well, such as firms issuing earnings warnings in the face of negative earnings surprises.
